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Abstract: The enterprises operating in the “quick loans” sector are 
microfinance institutions. Since they are not banking institutions, they need to 
adhere to more rigid financial management rules both in terms of fund raising 
and lending, especially regarding the so called “quick loans” category. The 
"quick loans" sector is defined as economic activity that, under the terms of the 
regulatory framework in force, allows a non-banking financial institution to 
provide unsecured (short-term) loans based on borrower’s income and credit 
profile and to charge high interest rates and added fees to offset the associated 
risk. The results of the survey confirm that this sector is a specific segment of 
the financial services sector that complies with the national regulations and 
creates a market for financial services that are essentially equivalent to the 
unsecured short-term bank loans but have profitability and return 
characteristics that make them competitive to the services offered by 
commercial banks. The successful of the financial management of these 
companies is based on their scoring models for assessing the risk of borrower’s 
default.  
Keywords: quick loans, scoring models, risk of default.  
JEL: F36; G29. 
*   *   * 
 
Introduction 
 
n the historical development of the financial system, lending is the principal 
means of monetary transfer of value. The interest on a loan is perceived 
both as the “price” a borrower has to pay for the right to use the lender’s 
financial resource for an agreed period of time, and as the reward the lender is 
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entitled to for being unable to enjoy the liquidity of his savings during this 
period. Historically, the transformation of lending from a favour between 
separate households into a service provided by enterprises (banks and non-
banking institutions) resulted in the creation of the crediting sector. The “quick 
loans) sector is defined as a specific and rapidly developing sector of financial 
services with characteristics and effects which often go beyond the regulatory 
frameworks in force. These characteristics are the focus of a study on this sector 
in Bulgaria and Romania as neighbouring countries which accessed the EU in 
2007 and in which the “quick loans” sector is characterized with high growth 
and market positioning levels. Therefore, the object of the research is the 
“quick loans” sector and its subject are the challenges faced by the financial 
management of the operations department of a branch of a Bulgarian non-
banking financial institution for “quick loans” (NBFIQL) in Romania. 
 
 
I. Theoretical research in the field of microfinance institutions 
 
The enterprises operating in the “quick loans” sector are known as 
microfinance institutions (MFI). Since they are not banking institutions, they 
need to adhere to more rigid financial management rules both in terms of fund 
raising and lending, especially regarding the so-called “quick loans” category. 
The "quick loans" sector is defined as economic activity that, under the terms 
of the regulatory framework in force, allows a non-banking financial institution 
to provide unsecured (short-term) loans based on borrower’s income and credit 
profile and to charge high interest rates and added fees to offset the associated 
risk. 
In their research paper, (Saeed, Javed, & Noreen, 2018) investigate the 
relationship between microfinance institutions governance and performance in 
South Asia before and after the financial crisis of 2007. According to (Koubâa, 
2014), the level of human capital development (in terms of education 
competences) is one of the key factors for access of the financially constrained 
entrepreneurs. (Khan & Ashta, 2013) believe that microfinance faces more than 
just credit risk, but also risk related to liquidity, market conditions, transactions, 
fraud, management, and reputation. The most successful microfinance 
institutions manage all these risks by assessing borrowers’ repayment capacity, 
information systems, and social insurance. In this respect, (Nedunchezian & 
Sivasankaran, 2009) studied the need for assessing the performance of 
stakeholders of microfinance programs. Based on his research, (Gurses, 2009) 
reaches the conclusion that there is a relation between the level of development 
of the financial institutions (including the microcredit businesses) and the level 
of poverty in a given country. Microcredit markets and institutions have 
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experienced a certain number of major crises over the last decades. 
Understanding the characteristics of those crises and their causes is of primary 
importance. An article published by (Guérin, Labie, & Morvant-Roux, 2018) 
attempts to define the dynamics that have led to those crises by analysing a set 
of factors at three levels: customers, institutions, and markets. The result of a 
research conducted by (Ssekiziyivu, Mwesigwa, Joseph, Nkote Nabeta, & 
Oyemomi, 2017) indicated that credit allocation and risk management had a 
significant relationship with loan portfolio performance of MFIs. A survey 
conducted by (de Oliveira Leite, 2017) reviews the evidences from several 
microfinance studies. The results provided evidence that microfinance can help 
the poor to become entrepreneurs, grow their business and save more. (Chopra, 
2017) studied the microfinance sector in India to find out that most of the clients 
of MFIs are y daily wage earners, marginal farmers, and women working from 
home. A research conducted by (Riggins & Weber, 2017)  provided empirical 
evidence that identification biases result in inefficient microcrerditing 
decisions. Prior empirical research in the field of microfinance indicate that 
there is the potential for identification bias whereby lenders may be motivated 
to give to specific projects with which they have an affinity without regard to 
whether it represents a sound financial investment.  
A study conducted by (Yimga, 2016) addresses the important question 
of how microfinance institutions are affected in the process by using panel data 
estimations to empirically investigate the causal effect of microfinance growth 
on microfinance institution loan portfolio quality. In their article (Lopatta & 
Tchikov, 2016) use multivariate regressions of economic development 
variables such as per capita gross national income, GDP growth, as well as 
gross capital formation against specific microfinance institutions’ variables to 
show that the success and performance of MFIs significantly influence 
economic development through the value that MFI performance adds to 
purchasing power. An article by (Sainz, Torre, López, & Sanfilippo, 2015) 
empirically analyses the reasons for crises in microfinance institutions in the 
period 2003–2011. There is no doubt that MFIs had a significant influence in 
terms of financial integration. In their paper, (Bhaskar & Subramanian, 2011) 
discuss an adaptive loan recommender system that assists the MFIs in making 
a more informed decision and help them grow with minimum resources. 
Recently, an innovative approach has gained popularity – the so-called 
relationship-based financing. This approach and its potential efficiency was 
analysed by (Pollinger, Outhwaite, & Cordero-Guzmán, 2007). The results of 
the analysis show that credit is generally being offered at interest rates that do 
not correspond to the risk levels of borrowers.  
The article of (Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2018) is an attempt to answer the 
question which characteristics of microfinance institutions affect the choice of 
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a decentralized loan approval process. The second concern of the author is 
whether the choice of allocating the loan approval decision to the loan officer 
enables a microfinance institution to expand its number of loans and improve 
its loan portfolio quality. The author concludes that a decentralized loan 
approval process improves MFIs’ breadth of outreach (the number of active 
borrowers) but does not affect the size of the loan portfolio and does not 
deteriorate their loan portfolio quality. 
Many publications discuss the problems faced by MFIs in terms of the 
available sources of financing. Most of these problems are associated with the 
fact that they do not have a fund-raising function (they are not permitted to 
collect deposits) and do not have access to debt capital (stock and/or bonds 
traded on the capital market  (Zahariev, 2012). An article by (Dorfleitner, Röhe, 
& Renier, 2017) examines the advantages of an alternative funding scheme 
which provides access of MFIs to debt capital from microfinance investment 
vehicles (MIVs). The results of the analysis show that the key predictors for 
success of this funding scheme are the maturity and the financial performance 
of MFIs. Other factors that affect the efficiency of this scheme are the size and 
the D/A ratio of the MFI for the previous year. MIV funding is associated with 
the requirement that MFIs  should eliminate the possibility for borrowers’ 
default rather than achieve high microcredit profitability. 
The potential sources of MFI funding are analyzed in detail in the article 
of (Al-Azzam & Mimouni, 2017). The main conclusion in the article is that the 
use of foreign currency debt, on average, leads to higher microcredit interest 
rates. The authors empirically prove that MFIs operating in countries with 
pegged exchange rate regimes and profit MFIs are better able to mitigate 
foreign currency risk. Moreover, the authors suggest that local currency debt is 
a better option for MFIs if the goal is to provide microcredit at lower interest 
rates. 
 The above studies prove the importance of MFIs and their microcredit 
services as a source of “quick loans” for the rapidly increasing demand for 
personal financing.  
In their study, (Khachatryan, Hartarska, & Grigoryan, 2017) investigate 
the joint impact of seven categories of capital on three dimensions of 
performance, using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method and panel 
data from MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia during the period 2005–
2009. The results suggest that performance is influenced by the preferences of 
the stakeholders who provide the capital. A study conducted by (Nersisyan & 
Dantas, 2017) uses the concept of the hierarchy of money to analyze the process 
of liquidity creation in modern capitalist economies where shadow banks play 
an active role. The authors abandon the narrow focus on banks as the creators 
of money as well as the idea that nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) are 
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mere intermediaries between savers and borrowers. According to (Popescu, 
Simionescu, Cărăba Meiță, & Popa, 2016), the credit risk of non-banking 
financial institutions is lower with borrowers with high levels of education and 
income, i.e. with a high “social status” level. Their results are based on binary 
logistic regressions. 
A paper by (Ghiță-Mitrescu, Duhnea, Antohi, & Moraru, 2016) 
investigates the importance of the non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) in 
Romania.  The findings of the research lead to the conclusion that, on one hand, 
the shadow banking system is poorly developed comparing to the traditional 
banking system and the NBFIs assets cumulated with the investments funds 
represent only 14% of the Romanian financial system, with a downward trend 
of the assets comparing with the banking system and a chaotic evolution of their 
profitability. On the other hand, the non-bank financial institutions proved that 
their lending activity brings benefits for the real economy because they offer 
funds to those sectors of activities poorly financed by the traditional banking 
system as trade, services, mining and manufacturing, and agriculture and may 
be of interest to encourage the development of this segment of the financial 
market. 
A key aspect of the financial analysis of non-banking financial 
institutions is their profit margin. A research conducted by (Cuéllar-Fernández, 
Fuertes-Callén, Serrano-Cinca, & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2016) aimed to determine 
the number and importance of margin determinants in microfinance. The 
research of (Leyshon, Signoretta, Knights, Alferoff, & Burton, 2006)  aims to 
assess the role of doorstep credit companies in the delivery of financial services 
in areas affected by high levels of financial and social exclusion. In particular, 
the paper looks at the relationship between agents and customers using two 
metaphors associated with interaction between different species in an 
ecological setting - namely, parasitism and symbiotic mutualism. A study 
conducted in 2014 by (Pole, Asawa, & Shah, 2014) analyze  the possibilities 
for financial engineering in funding MFIs through securitization deals as a 
viable option with priority sector lending norms remaining unchanged and 
direct lending to microfinance institutions seen as risky by banks. A paper by 
(Hollis & Sweetman, 1998) presents a historical review of the development and 
characteristics of MFIs. The authors reach the conclusion that depositor-based 
MFIs tend to last longer than IMFs financed by donations or government loans. 
There is a direct relation between the legal form of the MFIs and their 
performance. A research conducted by (Da Costa, 2017)  investigates the 
relationship between the legal forms adopted by microfinance institutions and 
their performance within three scopes: financial performance, social 
performance, and efficiency in resource allocation. The results of the analysis 
show that larger MFIs have higher profits, higher returns, and higher 
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operational self-sufficiency rates than smaller MFIs, indicating that MFI 
growth could enable consolidation in the microfinance market. The results also 
indicate that for smaller MFIs the way to consolidate and improve the indicators 
could be through assimilating or merging with other MFIs. It was also noted 
that non-bank financial institutions and rural banks are able to serve more 
customers and that cooperatives provide smaller loans, causing a bigger social 
impact, and that they obtain higher returns and profits. The results indicate that 
these legal forms may be the most appropriate for the microfinance market. 
 
 
II. An MFI business model  
 
A decision to open a branch or establish a subsidiary in a foreign country 
initiates a technical process for selection of a suitable office location and staff 
members. Since the development and success of any MFI depend on selecting 
a team of qualified employees, the selection process may last for as long as 6 
months. The selection of local residents who have the necessary qualification 
and certain experience in the sector is of paramount importance. Market 
penetration can be boosted if the company succeeds in recruiting people who 
have received relevant training or gained practical experience in rival 
companies. However, this poses the risk of copying certain bad practices. The 
company subject to our study selected the core team members and sent them 
for a one-month training in the head office of the parent company in Sofia, 
where they received specialized training according to their functions.  
In Romania, the main condition for a non-banking financial institution 
to obtain a license is a minimum capital requirement of EUR 200 000 for 
consumer lending and EUR 3 million for mortgage-backed lending (Marinov, 
2017). The most important specialists, who were trained first, were the 
Operations Officer and the IT Specialist, followed by the Call Centre Manager. 
When the training was completed, the staff started the tests of an ERP system 
developed especially for the subsidiary. Companies in the non-banking 
financial sector use different programs designed and maintained specifically for 
them. The selected program must be registered and licensed for use by the 
National Bank of Romania. This process lasts 20 business days. One of the most 
important structural units of an MFI is its call centre, because it combines 
several functions, such as advertising, customer checks and verification, 
crediting, staff control, etc. 
The call centre was located in close proximity to the head office and 
operated under its direct supervision during the first few months. After this 
initial period, it operates as a completely independent unit and can be relocated 
to a more remote location. The call centre is the contact point with the 
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customers – it receives incoming calls from customers and submits the infor-
mation about the client to the sales department. The sales representative or, in 
our case, a credit consultant visits the home of the customer to assess their 
creditworthiness by filling in a form with sufficient information about their 
employer, residential status, income, marital status and family members. The 
completed form is then submitted to the credit department, which is a structural 
unit of the call centre. The credit department verifies the submitted information 
(e.g. whether the ID provided is genuine or fake, whether the customer has a 
valid employment contract or pension income, whether the customers own the 
home they live in or are tenants, and last but not least, whether the potential 
borrower has other outstanding liabilities by checking in a credit register, if 
there is any.) At this stage the MFI faces several problems – despite the fact 
that it was registered as a personal data operator in Romania, non-bank financial 
institutions are not allowed to carry out detailed checks in the credit register of 
banks, a regulation which was revoked in 2014. Fake ID cards turned out an 
even greater problem due to the fact that the Romanian Ministry of Interior does 
not allow the validity or even presence of an identity document to be checked. 
Therefore, this verification is based solely on the information provided by the 
credit consultants and their objective assessment, which poses the risk of fraud 
and collusion between the consultant and the borrower or even a manager. 
A regional office is headed by a Regional Manager, a Team Deve-
lopment Manager, who is responsible for the management and training of a 
team of up to 15 credit consultants, and a Teller, whose job is to pay the amounts 
agreed by the consultants and to receive the amounts repaid on a daily basis. 
The operation of all regional offices are supervised by the central corporate 
(internal) security unit. The members of this unit are responsible to ensure that 
all departments and managers (operations, crediting, and call centres) observe 
the established rules in the company.  
The decision to launch the first regional office was taken on the grounds 
of a market survey and after a number of meetings, which resulted in a decision 
to avoid the risk of launching the first office in the highly competitive market 
in the capital, where the risk of attracting many customers prone to default in 
the first months would have meant a failure of the whole project. Another factor 
that influenced that decision was the fact that in a big city like Bucharest the 
cost of renting appropriate offices and recruiting qualified staff would have 
been significant. This is why the company decided to start with several offices 
in smaller towns with developed industry in order to resolve all concomitant 
problems and errors before entering the market in the capital and the major 
cities. The general objective was to penetrate the market and gradually cover 
the whole territory of the country, including the smaller settlements.  
  This launching strategy imposes several risks, such as: 
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- Less strict control from the central office – this problem was 
resolved at the cost of too many business trips; 
- Lack of direct communication with the central office management. 
Within four months, the training of the staff for the first regional (head) 
office was completed and the IT system for the call centre was commissioned. 
The Sales Manager and the Executive Director developed the advertising 
campaign to be launched in the location of the first regional office – the town 
of Pitesti. During the same period the managers, consultants, and teller were 
recruited for the regional office. The advertising campaign included direct mail 
of leaflets, branding of public transport vehicles, posters, billboards, and local 
broadcasts of radio and TV commercials.  
Two days after the start of the advertising campaign, the first clients 
showed interest in our services. The main problem with such clients is that 90% 
of them are people with financial obligations to other financial institutions, who 
are very likely to default on their loans in the future. This is proved by statistical 
cluster analyses of different categories of loans grouped according to their 
maturity, size, repayment terms, etc. 
The ratio of full-time to part-time employees is an important factor from 
the enterprises in the microfinance sector. About 80% of the workload is carried 
by the credit consultants and part-time loan brokers. However, in 2015 
Romania enforced a ban on the part-time labour contracts, which resulted in 
significantly higher labour costs for the company. The leading MFIs started 
using self-employed brokers (sole proprietors) as credit consultants at a ratio of 
one full-time employee to three self-employed consultants. An analysis of the 
labour market shows that the job of a credit consultant is considered 
unattractive (i.e. auxiliary and low-qualified) and therefore the company had to 
use more freelance (self-employed) consultants for its operations. At the same 
time the number of consultants who do not consider it necessary to operate as 
self-employed persons or run their own companies is growing because the 
related costs cannot be reimbursed by the MFIs.  
One manager manages up to 15 consultants, and within 2 years, the staff 
turnover rate reached 85%. Most team members are quickly demotivated by the 
high target levels set by the company and decide to quit because the level of 
their remuneration depends on the level of achievement of these targets (e.g. 
number of loan agreements signed, number of new clients and, last but not least, 
the rate of repayment of the loans extended by the consultant). These 
performance indicators are easy to manipulate and use in a fraudulent manner. 
For example, each new credit consultant is required to conclude 25 new loan 
agreements. Of course, the extension of existing agreements also counts, but 
the idea is that consultants should advertise and attract new clients to earn 
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additional income. According to the statistics, the call centre attracts between 
10 and 25 new borrowers per month.  
Each regional office on average covers an area with 30,000 to 150,000 
residents, which means that very few clients would contact the consultants 
through the call centre although it is the principal contact point for new clients. 
This is why the consultants are encouraged to advertise the products and seek 
new clients. For some consultants this job is auxiliary (i.e. it is not their main 
occupation) and they are happy to have several loyal clients who would provide 
them with a minimum guaranteed income although they do not achieve the set 
targets. In contrast, new consultants have to achieve the targets in order to get 
paid and often resort to fraudulent methods, which most often include the use 
of fake IDs for the loan agreements they conclude.  
Many of these fictitious loans are discovered within several months due 
to good communication with the manager. For example, a consultant submits a 
loan request from a non-existent client to a manager, and the latter transfers the 
information to the credit department for approval or rejection of the requested 
loan. All start-up companies try to minimize the number of rejections as this is 
considered bad publicity and, therefore, during the first three to four months, 
half of the approved loans are very risky and for the next 6 months the company 
is relatively tolerant towards past-due repayments. Thus, the consultant 
“borrows” the amount of BGN 500 with a weekly repayment schedule of BGN 
55. He pays the first two repayment instalments according to the approved 
schedule and delays the third repayment for a couple of days telling the manager 
that “the client” faces some temporary difficulties and will not default on the 
rest of the payments. Then he makes the third and, possibly, the fourth 
scheduled repayment, after which the client disappears mysteriously. This is a 
typical example of a fictitious credit with a delay of the possibility of fraud 
being detected. During the period of delay, the same consultant may hand out 
dozens of fictitious loans due to lack of adequate or sufficient control by the 
credit department.   
The internal security experts check selected clients using a default and 
risk profile algorithm. The algorithm is based on commonly accepted scoring 
models. A scoring model includes a statistical analysis of the client's profile and 
weighs various predefined variables to form a score, which forms the basis for 
approval or rejection of the requested loan. Depending on the company's policy, 
this model may be restrictive or liberal. Restrictive models provide scores that 
result in about 55% rejects of the requests. Scoring models are based on 
mathematical and statistical algorithms and data collected through basic, 
company-specific measurements. For example, the Romanian MFI Happy 
Credit uses a relatively simple model based on the following 10 basic questions 
the credit consultant is required to ask the potential borrower: 
Economic Archive 2/2019 
   
52 
1. Do you have a permanent employment contract? 
2. Do you own a car? 
3. Do you own a home (house/flat)? 
4. Did you complete any educational level? 
5. Are you married? 
6. Is your home fully furnished? 
7. Do you have a guarantor? 
8. Do you have children? 
9. What is the size of your income? 
10. Do you hold a bank account? 
The consultant marks each of these questions as answered positively or 
negatively (Yes or No). If there are 5 or more positive answers, the requested 
loan is approved. This is the simplest and at the same time the most imperfect 
scoring model.  
The scoring model of the Romanian Easy Credit company includes a 
large number of variables and databases organized by region, town, occupation 
and age group. Although the total number of these variables is over 50, none of 
them is sufficiently indicative or dependent on any other variable. In the 
occupation database the borrowers are classified into 10 general groups of 
occupations. Тук се срещат и първите трудности при чисто статистически 
анализ на групите хора, за да се предвиди по-голяма точност за 
предвидимостта на модела.  
 On the basis of a preliminary analysis, all groups are clustered and 
expressed as variables to be used in the analysis. When there are only a few 
observed parameters, but they do not differ significantly, groups of dummy 
variables were created to reduce the total number of variables. The clustering 
procedure identified the main groups which are significant for predicting the 
possibility for default. These variables were modified further during the 
analysis process. 
 More than 120 variables were available for the model. A default 
probability models must be based on the best combination of factor variables, 
including default ones. A dependent variable has two alternative values: default 
or non-default. The model is based on a statistical method known as logarithmic 
regression and can be expressed as: 
PD = 1/(1+e-y), 
where: 
PD is the probability for default during the whole repayment period; 
y = B0 + B1x1 + B2 x2 + ... + Bnxn (y is the weighted value using the 
SUMPRODUCT function in MS Excel); 
B0     is constant;  
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B1 ... Bn are factors (weights) that correspond to the importance of each 
variable used in the model and are determined using a statistical analysis 
of the clients of NBMFI.  
x1 ... xn is the scoring base, which is individual for each client. 
The statistical analysis determines the values of B0 ... Вn, which show 
the lowest deviation between the forecast PD value and the actual default rate 
from the database (using the least squares method). The actual statistical 
analysis uses on a large number of variable combinations to determine the 
variables and weights for the scoring model.  
The table below shows the main statistical combinations of variables 
that were recommended. The first column shows the coefficients (values or 
weights) of the variables that match most closely the actual default scenarios 
(PD = 100%). The last column shows the statistical significance of these 
coefficients. The lowest their value is, the more significant these coefficients 
are. 
The main criteria for selection of variables are: 
1) The variable should be significantly different from zero. With a large 
number of observations, a high level of significance is required, for example 
99%, meaning that there is a 99% probability that the coefficient or parameter 
is greater than. With fewer observations, the acceptable level of significance is 
95%. 
2) The overall model should result in a significant improvement of the 
variables in the credit consultant's questionnaire. 
3) The coefficient values should seem logical based on our common 
sense and practical experience with other models. 
Some of the variables in the table above do not meet the 95% signi-
ficance criterion but are logical. Most of the variables are statistically signi-
ficant. Generally, the “not applicable/available” (NA) records are eliminated by 
combining them with other variables with low weights (e.g. "occupation” and 
“labour contract".) Some less important variables, such as “credit history”, 
“retirement status”, “less than 6 months with current employer”, and “tenant” 
should be kept because they logically reflect factors that affect the social status 
and the repayment capacity of the borrower. 
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Table 1 
Variables used in the scoring model of an MFI 
Regression table Coef. SE Coef. Z P 
Constant -7.87310 0.71260 -11.05 0.000 
Office no. 1004 0.88730 0.27250 3.26 0.001 
Office no. 1005 0.40090 0.18840 2.13 0.033 
Office no. 1008 0.73320 0.34020 2.16 0.031 
Office no. 1011 -1.65620 0.73090 -2.27 0.023 
Root 3 of the loan size 0.60701 0.07571 8.02 0.000 
Up to 12 weeks -0.89930 0.19260 -4.67 0.000 
Up to 16 weeks -0.85080 0.26590 -3.20 0.001 
Up to 32 weeks 0.36440 0.15430 2.36 0.018 
No credit history 0.27570 0.19580 1.41 0.159 
Good credit history (no defaults) -1.70600 0.62500 -2.73 0.006 
Zone 42 1.30320 0.32580 4.00 0.000 
Under 40 years of age 0.44960 0.14880 3.02 0.003 
Male 0.53960 0.13940 3.87 0.000 
Married or de-facto married -0.36790 0.13350 -2.76 0.006 
Occupation: NA, 5 or 7 2.18330 0.20840 10.48 0.000 
Labour contract: NA, 2 or 5 0.44330 0.14600 3.04 0.002 
Retired -0.53730 0.50750 -1.06 0.290 
Less than 6 months with current 
employer 0.27540 0.18350 1.50 0.133 
Square root of income -0.04338 0.01332 -3.26 0.001 
Total income over 1100 -0.44990 0.22710 -1.98 0.048 
Tenant  0.12190 0.19340 0.63 0.529 
Lives with parents -0.38980 0.16650 -2.34 0.019 
Owns a car -0.60440 0.15600 -3.88 0.000 
Bank account holder -0.20050 0.13610 -1.47 0.141 
Involved in legal proceedings 3.41400 1.29900 2.63 0.009 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from the database of a Romanian MFI 
 
 
III. Recommendations and conclusions 
 
Romania’s legislators added two new requirements to the regulations 
applicable to non-bank financial institutions. According to these requirements, 
NBFIs must be registered in a special registry and are subject to "rational" 
supervision by the National Bank of Romania (Marinov, 2017):  
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• The disclosure of the volume of newly issued loans over a certain 
period, regardless of the fact that they are no longer reported in the balance 
sheet of the non-bank financial institution (i.e. they are already repaid or sold 
to collector firms), has an important informative value. 
• Calculation of an indicator which shows the actual average cost 
incurred by the borrower (in addition to the effective annual interest rate). This 
indicator shows the cause-and-effect relation between price and risk and can 
infer an excessive risk exposure of the NBFI. 
Regardless of the regulations in force, the commonly applicable 
decision-making models for microfinance loan approval, some functions of MS 
Excel can be used to identify the following good practices in the microfinance 
sector: 
First. The statistical models in MS Excel are based on conventional and, 
therefore, conservative assessment of the probability for default. When they are 
modified by including additional creditworthiness descriptors, their prediction 
accuracy can be improved. When there is no information (i.e. “NA” record) 
about a given indicator, its weight is better adapted to the final score! 
Second. The key PD indicator is estimated for the entire repayment 
period. The PD values are further transformed into an annual empirical value 
for this indicator. Therefore, the model is iteratively adaptive to the customer 
base, taking into account the annual values of this key evaluation indicator. 
Thus, for each category of borrowers, a precisely established limit value of the 
weighted average evaluation variable (score) resulting from the introduction of 
all available descriptors is calculated. The score is the basis for following three 
possible decisions:  
• the loan request is approved;  
• the loan request is rejected;  
• the loan request may be approved with a certain risk assumption. 
The model is easy to adapt and modify by adding new descriptors that 
correspond to the specific regional characteristics of the borrowers. 
Third. The data from the scoring model used in each regional office of 
the NBMFI can be used for supervision and control over the outstanding and 
repaid amounts by customer clusters. This would enable the management to 
determine the most profitable (i.e. those with lower risk exposures) loan 
maturity periods and adjust the repayment schedules accordingly as well as to 
decide what assistance to provide to certain regional offices or, where 
appropriate, consider their risk exposures. The approach to each region depends 
on the policy adopted by the NBMFI. Risk assessment, however, does not apply 
only to the financial sector and the microfinance institutions. Such models are 
applied practically in all business areas, including the most innovative ones, 
such as biotechnologies, electricity trade exchanges, etc. (Nedev, 2016)  
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Fourth. After 2010, NBMFIs implemented procedures for selection (or 
shortlisting) of both clients and employees. Although a lot of lob applicants 
have previous experience in the financial sector, which gives them an advantage 
on the competitive microfinance market, there are also many inexperienced 
applicants for jobs in NBMFIs. However, empirical data regarding the volume 
of sales has shown that inexperienced employees often perform better than 
experienced ones. This was corroborated in practice during the expansion of 
Bulgarian NBMFIs in different cities and regions in Romania. On the other 
hand, managers who come from other NBMFIs quite often submit the entire 
client database of their previous employer to their new NBMFI and thus have 
personal contribution to the success of their new employer by enhancing their 
score model for risk and creditworthiness assessment.    
Fifth. NBMFIs are mostly trying to recruit employees with previous 
experience in rival companies. The experience of the Bulgarian NBMFI 
branches in Romania shows that within 5 months such employees have a 
marked positive effect on the performance indicators of their regional office. 
For example, the repayment rate of such regional offices increased from 84% 
at the beginning of the period to 93% in 2019. The adopted “client shortlisting” 
procedure is restrictive, because it rejects most of the clients who request a new 
loan to repay an existing obligation. If such a request is approved, it would 
count as a new loan for the consultant and would result in an unrealistic 
assessment of their performance. Therefore, the adopted policy for rejection of 
refinancing (rollover) loans has a disciplining effect for both employees and 
clients. Thus, branches with significant volumes of outstanding (past due) 
payments are not allowed to issue new loans until their receivables reach a 
specified amount and maturity structure. This restrictive policy naturally forces 
the employees who cannot achieve their targets either to leave the company or 
increase their efforts to meet the set repayment targets. The "shortlisting" 
procedure is based on a statistical model, according to which an office with an 
outstanding receivables rate above 12% automatically gets a ban to refinance 
existing loans from the credit department of the NBMFI’s headquarters. If the 
performance does not improve within a week, new sales are automatically 
banned and fines are imposed on branch-level management. Such measures, 
however, often lead to collective resignations, which results in staff shortage 
for the regional office but also reduces the amount of its outstanding receivables 
and improves its performance.  
Sixth. The use of a sectoral communication approach often solves some 
specific loan issues and prevents the rollover of loans among different NBMFIs. 
Thus, if a loan taken from company A is then partially repaid with a loan from 
company B and then the borrower takes another loan from company A to repay 
part of the loan taken from company B, within 3 months the borrower will 
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usually owe money (principal and interest) to both companies. The NBMFIs 
created a common database for this type of borrowers, who account for 12% of 
all clients in this sector in Romania. The results of this method for exchange of 
information was a reduction of the bad credits by 16% annually.  
Seventh. A loan request is either approved or rejected by the credit 
department on the grounds of the information submitted by the regional office, 
a verification of the client’s the employment status, and a telephone interview 
with the applicant, which is an important but ineffective way to validate the 
available information. This widespread control method is often misleading due 
to the fact that there is no direct contact and it cannot establish whether and to 
what extent the applicant is a real person. The competition in the sector is fierce 
and the most important challenge is how to facilitate the approval process, how 
to conduct checks more quickly and efficiently, how to deliver money to the 
customer faster, and how to eliminate or mitigate the risk of fraud. Experience 
has shown that the shift from conventional to online lending reduces much of 
the company's costs, especially staff costs and overheads. The safety of online 
lending seems logical because the loan is paid to order into a bank account, but 
online lending cannot cover people who do not have bank accounts or access to 
Internet, who constitute a significant part of the market. According data 
collected from microfinance borrowers, only 35% of them have access to online 
banking. This is why about 60 percent of the NBMFIs in Romania offer a mix 
of online and standard services. The share of online lending grows by 8% 
annually and the number of NBMFIs who have their own online lending 
platforms is growing as well. The online lending model circumvents the 
regulatory interest rate restriction of up to 50% due to the fact that it 
significantly reducesstaff costs and overheads while the APR with the 
conventional model varies between 240% and 360%, and the regulatory 
restrictions are circumvented I various ways, such as faster processing options, 
unsecured lending, etc.  
Eighth. The regulators from the CB face the dilemma whether to 
continue disregarding the high interest rates charged by the NBMFIs or to 
impose harsher restrictions and thus to create an advantage for the commercial 
banks and force some of the NBMFIs to become shadow economy operators. 
Both Bulgaria and Romania adopted such policies for interest rate restrictions, 
on which the national associations of non-bank financial institutions having 
expressed their opinions several times. The first major t change regarding the 
NBMFIs was made in 2012 with attempts to enforce requirements for tablets, 
in which the consultants enter the applicant’s data and the scoring model 
automatically calculates the maximum amount of the loan that can be granted. 
Moreover, the tablets were to be used for scanning of documents as well as 
taking pictures of the applicant’s property to be used as a loan collateral, thus 
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mitigating the risk of default. At the same time, the NBMFIs developed 
microfinance products that follow the credit card model. These innovations aim 
to mitigate the risk of fraud, to alleviate the lending procedures and to solve the 
most serious problem, viz. repayment delay and default.   
Ninth. NBMFI’s policy regarding bad credits is an important factor. 
Author’s experience as a manager of a Romanian branch of Bulgarian NBMFI 
has shown that these credits constitute 22% of all loans. Every NBMFI has 
adopted its own policy on clients facing financial difficulties. An approbated 
empirical model which gives positive results consists of the following steps:  
• A borrower in delay of up to 3 repayment instalments is contacted by 
a call centre operator; 
• Borrowers in delay of up to 6 repayment instalments are visited in 
person both in their homes and at their workplaces by their consultant and the 
office manager; 
• Borrowers in delay of up to 9 repayment instalments are visited in 
person both in their homes and at their workplaces by their consultant, the office 
manager and an officer from the internal security department. However, there 
so many clients in default that internal security officers cannot visit them all. 
• Borrowers in delay of over 6 months are brought to court or their 
outstanding obligations are sold to debt collector firms. 
Unfortunately, empirical experience has shown that 30% of the loans 
with past due repayment are fictitious or otherwise fraudulent. A newly 
established NBMFI cannot afford to sue so many of its customers because this 
will ruin its image. When a new NBMFI is launched, the risk of bad customers 
and bad credits is enormous. This is due to the fact that the rival companies 
from the sector exert serious pressure on their clients with past due payments 
to borrow from the new company in order to repay the money owed to them. A 
number of surveys have shown that about 45% of all applicants have 
obligations to rival companies, which is indicative of a vicious circle due to fact 
that the microfinance companies cannot deal with these clients. Their 
outstanding obligations keep growing each month until they become permanent 
lawsuit defendants. This is why the information should be submitted to a central 
credit registry, which already operates effectively in Bulgaria. In Romania, 
however, such a practice still does not exist, and access to such information is 
available only for the commercial banks. NBMFIs also maintain a customer 
retention index, which shows whether an office works well with customers as 
well as the efficiency of information handling by its call centre. In Bulgaria, the 
average percentage of clients who take out a second loan is 45% but for some 
offices it reaches 65%. In Romania, the average percentage is around 15%, 
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which shows that most borrowers take out a loan only when this is very 
necessary. The index is useful as a fraud prevention tool as well.  
Tenth. The model based on a PDA-equipped consultant with sufficient 
amount of cash on hand is not an alternative to the "office-based" lending due 
to the fact that the number of frauds committed by consultants is growing. 
Despite the fact that the personal visit model is convenient for the clients, 
because they do not have to go to the office of the company in person, according 
to recent surveys conducted in Romania, 7% of the clients would rather visit 
the offices of the non-bank financial institution to make their payments. 
Nevertheless, the number of companies that resort to innovative methods of 
promotion and lending is growing worldwide. According to various surveys, 
people rank first the speed of the approval procedure, followed by staff attitude, 
extension opportunities, and least of all the price of the loan. The individual 
consultations model is coming into its own because it provides opportunities 
for offering repayment schedules tailored to the client's specific characteristics. 
The standard office is being replaced by the so-called "money shop", where the 
main employee is the teller. On the other hand, the imposition of severe 
restrictions could restrict the access of many potential clients and lead to usury. 
The above ten recommendations for successful business of Bulgarian 
NBMFIs in Romania are based on the author's experience as a manager in such 
a company and the logical but inevitable adaptation of successful financial 
management models to the local regulatory framework and market specifics. 
 
*   *   * 
 
The microfinance sector is a specific segment of the market for financial 
services, which is subject to national regulations and is an alternative to 
personal lending of commercial banks but offers credit products with consumer 
benefits that provide profitability and return, regardless of the competition of 
these banks. The penetration of a Bulgarian microfinance company on the 
market resulted in a rational market innovation and regulatory adaptation of the 
financial management and risk assessment procedures developed by the parent 
company. 
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